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Workmen's Compensation and the
Scholarship Athlete
Sheldon Elliot Steinbach*
"It costs a lot to field a college football team and run an athletic
program-and the price keeps going up." E. E. Bernard, Ohio
State University Athletics Dept. Business Manager, quoted in
the Washington Post November 19, 1969., p. E 1.
T HE PAST TWO DECADES have witnessed phenomenal growth of major
intercollegiate sports. In particular, college football has maintained
a steady increase in home attendance, from the end of World War II to
the present. Accompanying this enormous expansion in popularity has
been a concurrent dependence by colleges and universities on the gate
receipts of major sports attractions. With costs rising between 12 to
15% a year, the athletic departments are under increasing pressure to
produce winning teams in popular sports in order to meet budgetary
demands.' Generally, football and basketball revenues have been used
to balance the athletic department budget by supporting other non-
revenue producing sports, intramural activities, and a host of other
athletic department functions. Some institutions which have developed
financially successful athletic programs have been able to utilize the
receipts for financing capital improvements for the school as a whole.
Colleges and universities are remarkably hesitant to reveal pertinent
figures concerning their athletic program. However, a recent article in a
major newspaper, on the University of Oklahoma, gives one a good pic-
ture of the comprehensive athletic scholarship program that is under-
taken by institutions in order to produce revenue. According to the
data disclosed, Oklahoma presently awards 125 full scholarships in foot-
ball, 25 in basketball, 30 in track, 20 in baseball, 6 in golf, 6 in tennis,
30 in wrestling, 14 in swimming, and 12 in gymnastics.2
Television and radio receipts constitute another factor which has
turned collegiate football into big business. With the NCAA skimming
* Staff Associate with the Commission on Federal Relations at the American Coun-
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1 Besides 280 full scholarship athletes whose cost of education averages $1900 per
student, Ohio State athletic department lists other miscellaneous expenses for foot-
ball coach and 9 assistants: $357,000; policemen and gatemen $64,000, clothing and
equipment $39,200, shoes $10,000, movies of games and practice sessions $20,000, meals
for athletes $46,146, and transportation $18,000. Washington Post, November 19, 1969,
at E. 1.
2 The National Observer, September 29, 1969, p. 1. Ohio State is allowed 30 football
scholarships a year, 6 basketball, and 34 for other sports. There are, therefore, 280
students on campus getting their education paid for-tuition, books, fees and $15 a
month for laundry-from athletic funds, mostly football. Washington Post, Novem-
ber 19, 1969, at E. 1.
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4]2 % off the top, a school participating in a nationally televised game
will receive in the neighborhood of $350,000, and approximately $225,000
for a regionally televised game. 3 TV and Bowl revenue where received
is divided among the other conference members in order to enable all to
share in the good fortune. Stated simply, a consistently winning team,
resulting from the use of numerous scholarship athletes, brings larger
gate receipts, national recognition, and TV revenue.
The scholarship-attendance-athletic program cycle affects both the
so-called "big" schools as well as the small. This fall, Johns Hopkins
University, certainly not a major athletic powerhouse-with the excep-
tion of lacrosse, instituted a policy of charging admission to football,
basketball, and lacrosse games for the first term in over thirty years, in
order to continue other non-revenue producing sports such as swimming,
fencing, golf, and track. In short, some forms of intercollegiate athletics
constitute a substantial business operation, a monetary resource that is
tapped by the various institutions to meet financial commitments that
would otherwise have to be met with general funds.
The current state of college football was succinctly summarized by
an editorial in the Wall Street Journal which stated in part that "College
football; which chose this year to celebrate its centennial, can be highly
profitable. Football often supports a school's entire athletic program and
it usually is a help in holding alumni financial support."
The danger is that a school will let its athletic and academic pro-
gram get out of balance. The danger has increased in recent years, as
television has multiplied football's potential financial rewards. In some
cases schools have come to see-and treat-athletes less as students than
as tools to be manipulated for profit.
4
Into this picture of big time business comes the student athlete, who
is a most important element in this financial world. With a desire to
maximize revenue, and obtain public acclaim and alumni support,
institutions recruit high school athletes with a degree of vigor, determi-
nation and organization that is reminiscent of the professional football
draft before the merger of the two leagues. 5 With scholarships, part-time
jobs, and other sometimes hidden extras, the potential All-American is
cajoled and flattered into signing a letter of intent and, if all goes well,
he eventually arrives on campus. The scholarship athlete is expected to
engage in almost daily practices before and during the season, and to
participate in scheduled games, or to forfeit all financial aid. The qu'es-
3 See The National Observer, September 29, 1969, at 1.
4 The Wall Street Journal, November 11, 1969, at 15.
5 E. E. Bernard, Ohio State business manager, stated that "Recruiting is a big factor.
A university attempting to keep pace in a major conference must put seven or eight
men on the road. They visit families of prospects, entertain, invite visits to the
campus." Washington Post, November 19, 1969, at E. 1.
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W. C. AND SCHOLARSHIP ATHLETE
tion arises whether a scholarship athlete whose scholarship is solely de-
pendent on his active participation on an athletic team, and who is
injured in practice or in a game, should be able to qualify for Workmen's
Compensation. This problem involves (aside from the moral issue) the
question of whether an injured athlete should lose his scholarship, a
crucial question that is beyond the scope of our present inquiry.
For statutory guidance, let us look to the Ohio law. The purpose
of the Ohio Constitutional provision, Article 2, Section 35, authorizing
passage of laws relating to Workmen's Compensation, is to make pay-
ment of compensation thereafter provided by law for accidental injuries
to employees, occasioned in the course of the employee's employment,
a charge on the industry, and to make business and the ultimate con-
sumer of its products, and not have the injured employee, bear the
burden of compensating for accidental injuries incident to such business.6
The Workmen's Compensation Act deprives the employer of the
common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and
the fellow servant doctrine, in exchange for limitation of his liability
to contributions to an insurance fund. It also permits the employee to
recover an award of compensation for accidents and occupational dis-
eases wholly independent of fault of the employer or employee, while
simultaneously depriving the employee of the common law action for
negligence, with the only limitation that the worker must not suffer from
a self-inflicted injury.7 Liability under the Workmen's Compensation
Act arises out of the law itself and, strictly, is neither tortious nor con-
tractual, but depends on status created by employment.8
In order to recover under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the
relation of employer and employee must exist, and an injured employee
must show that his injuries resulted from the work he was employed to
perform and that such injuries were received while engaged in the
business of his employer and in the furtherance of the employer's
affairs.9
The relationship of employer and employee, within the Workmen's
Compensation Act, depends primarily on the employer's right to direct
the manner in which the work shall be done and, although selection,
engagement, payment of wages, and the power of dismissal all are
relevant, they are not necessarily conclusive.10
To be amenable to the Workmen's Compensation Act an employee
must be a regular, not merely a casual employee, a concept that is de-
6 Jones v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 60 Ohio App. 465, 21 N.E. 2d 1014 (1939).
7 Shoemaker v. Electric Auto Lite Co., 69 Ohio App. 169, 41 N.E. 2d 433 (1942).
8 Bozzelli v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 122 Ohio St. 201, 171 N.E. 108 (1930).
9 Tipple v. High Street Hotel Co., 70 Ohio App. 397, 41 N.E. 2d 879 (1942) citing
(then) Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 1465-1. And see, Oleck, Horseplay by Employees, 17
Clev-Mar. L. Rev. 438 (1968).
10 Case v. Industrial Commission, 62 Ohio App. 219, 23 N.E. 2d 652 (1939).
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fined not by the length of employment but by the nature of the em-
ployment."
A workman is a "regular employee" rather than a casual employee
within the Workmen's Compensation Act if he is hired to do work in
the trade, business, profession or occupation of the employer.
1 2
It has generally been held, however, that where materials are fur-
nished and the individuals are told what to do and how to do it, one
generally has established an employer-employee relationship.'
3
Aside from the establishment of an employer-employee relationship,
the injury sustained, in order to be compensable, must have occurred in
the course of employment. This has been defined by the cases to mean
an act which takes place during the period of employment, at a place
where the employee may reasonably be, and where he is performing his
duties or something reasonably incidental to his employment.1
4
Ohio, as has almost every other state, has held the Workmen's
Compensation Act to be remedial in nature, which entails that it should
be given a liberal construction in order to accomplish the purpose in-
tended, and that such construction shall be made in favor of the
claimant.15
Courts have examined the position of the scholarship athlete as a
claimant under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and have held that
he is an employee for purposes of the act. The first case to pass favor-
ably on the application for workmen's compensation by a scholarship
athlete was University of Denver v. Nemeth.16 In April, 1950, while
engaged in spring football practice, Nemeth suffered an accidental injury
to his back. At the time he was receiving $50 per month from the
university for work done on or about the campus tennis courts.
The university contended that Nemeth was a casual employee, that
his job had no connection with his playing football, and that the applica-
tion of Workmen's Compensation Act to scholarship students contra-
venes public policy. The court held that "higher education in this day is
a business and a big one," 17 and "that a student employed by the uni-
11 Schneeberg v. Industrial Commission, 67 Ohio App. 499, 37 N.E. 2d 427 (1941);
Hanes v. Ticatch, 104 Ohio App. 523, 150 N.E. 2d 493 (1958).
12 Riese v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 55 Ohio App. 76, 8 N.E. 2d 567 (1937).
13 Look v. Hinkle, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 176, 113 N.E. 2d 611 (1953).
14 General Motors Corp. v. Louson, 14 Ohio Misc. 129, 232 N.E. 2d 657, af'd. 15 Ohio
App. 2d 192, 240 N.E. 2d 100 (1967). A professor in the employ of Ohio State Uni-
versity, who during his vacation periods attends meetings not required or contem-
plated by his contract of employment is not performing services for such university
and is not an employee within the meaning of workmen's compensation law, even
though he is attending the meetings as a representative of the university. 1934 Ohio
Atty. Gen. Op. No. 2988.
15 Nelson v. Industrial Commission, 150 Ohio State 1, 80 N.E. 2d 430 (1950); Keenan
v. Young, 195 N.E.2d 382 (Ohio, 1963).
16 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953).
17 Id. at 425-6.
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versity to discharge certain duties, not a part of his education program,
is no different than the employee who is taking no course of instruction
so far as the Workmen's Compensation Act is concerned." 18
The record revealed that Nemeth was informed that "it would be
decided on the football field who receives the meals and the jobs." 19
The coach testified that meals and the job ceased when the student was
"cut from the football squad." 20
Despite the university's claim that 800 students who were being
assisted in obtaining their education would have to seek work elsewhere,
or quit their education, if the decision favored the claimant, the court
found no evidence to support the proposition that the application of the
Workmen's Compensation Act in this instance would contravene public
policy.
In holding that the claimant was a qualified applicant for Workmen's
Compensation, the court stated that "the obligation to compensate
Nemeth arises solely because of the nature of the contract, its incident
and responsibilities which Nemeth assumed in order to not only earn his
remuneration, but to retain his job . . . The university hired him to
perform work on the campus, and as an incident of this work to have
him engage in football." 21
Another case to pass on the subject was Van Horn v. Industrial
Accident Commission,2 2 which involved an application for death benefits
by a widow and minor children of a California Polytechnic College foot-
ball team member who was killed in an October, 1960 plane crash while
returning with squad members from a game in Ohio.
The District Court held that a scholarship and "rent money" re-
ceived from the school constituted payment for the decedent's football
activities, thereby creating an employment relationship between the
decedent and the school.
In addition to a small scholarship, the player in this instance re-
ceived a subsidy from a coach-controlled fund maintained by business-
men in San Luis Obispo, known as the Mustang Booster Club, which
was designed to subsidize married student housing off campus in order
to make it comparable to campus accommodations. The foregoing finan-
cial aid was totally dependent on the decedent's remaining on the foot-
ball team.
The university argued that treating athletic scholarships as payment
for services would unjustly burden institutions of higher education,




21 Id. at 430.
22 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1963).
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men's Compensation law itself was the true embodiment of public pol-
icy-the protection of the worker. It was also sufficiently clear to the
court that the student in this case was not a volunteer, nor a donee of
charitable benevolence, but an employee within the full meaning of the
act.2
3
The school contended that the inclusion of student actors or band
players who receive scholarship assistance under workmen's compensa-
tion coverage would be incompatible with the legislative intent. The
court, after stating that "there is authority for the proposition that one
who participates for compensation as a member of an athletic team may
be an employee within the statutory scheme of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act," 24 distinguished football by holding that "it cannot be said
as a matter of law that every student who receives an athletic scholar-
ship and plays on the school team is an employee of the school." 25 The
court acknowledged that an athletic scholarship for track, fencing, or
swimming, may be looked at in a different light than is football or
basketball, due to the financial gain for the institution.
2 6
Lastly, the college argued that the increased cost of Workmen's
Compensation coverage would discourage the giving of athletic scholar-
ships. The court offered a simple solution to the potential scholarship
problem, by suggesting that schools award scholarships without creating
an employment relationship. A player injured while performing gra-
tuitously would not be an employee, and his injury would not be
compensable under the Act. It is furthermore clear that any increased
cost incurred by carrying workmen's compensation insurance can be
easily passed on to the public in the form of higher admission prices.
The Van Horn and Nemeth cases are clearly distinguishable from
State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Fund,27 where a claim for
compensation for the death of a scholarship athlete was denied. The
court found that the evidence failed to disclose any contractual obliga-
tion to play football, and that decedent's employment was not dependent
on playing football. To aid it in reaching its decision, the court made
the finding that the college, Fort Lewis A. & M., was not in the football
business and received no benefit from this kind of recreation.
23 See Athletic Association of University of Illinois v. Industrial Commission, 384 Ill.
208, 51 N.E. 2d 157 (1943), where a member of the swimming team, without remu-
neration, was injured while taking part in a circus staged by the physical education
department and was denied workmen's compensation since he was a mere volunteer,
not an employee.
24 33 Cal. Rept. 173 (1963).
25 Id. at 175.
26 In Todd School v. Industrial Commission, 412 Ill. 453, 107 N.E. 2d 745 (1952), it
was held that work done by a student under the direction of faculty and resulting in
benefit to the school, does not in itself create a relationship of employer-employee in
institutions of higher education; however, the Todd School did receive substantial
financial benefit from athletic gate receipts.
27 135 Colo. 570, 314 P. 2d 288 (1957).
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Although only two states have clearly passed on the status of the
injured, subsidized athlete, the guidelines in this area seem clear. Work-
men's Compensation law is a law of a remedial nature and is liberally
construed in all states. The Van Horn case is strictly limited to those
instances where a school has materially benefited from the student's
activities, and where the continuance of financial aid is solely dependent
upon his performance of those activities. In order to avoid the impact
of Van Horn and Nemeth, the schools must eliminate any contractual
J i iiL1i1 W ilIkI L U VV LUr; J3JJ LL1v I uWdL UI V1 ~I Wd J.CUI oulliIljJ
aid only so long as the student plays on the team. If this proviso is
eliminated from scholarship awards, the athlete's participation can be
characterized under the law as voluntary or merely gratuitous, thereby
avoiding the effect of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Should insti-
tutions of higher education persist in retaining a contractual employment
relationship with their scholarship athletes, whereby financial aid is only
dispensed as long as the student is a participating team member, it is
only just that the student be protected and receive the benefits under
Workmen's Compensation for any injuries sustained while employed by
his school.
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